Stealthy attacks on smart grid PMU state estimation

Sarita Paudel, Paul Smith, Tanja Zseby

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandKonferenzbeitragBegutachtung

Abstract

Smart grids require communication networks for supervision functions and control operations. With this they become attractive targets for attackers. In newer power grids, State Estimation (SE) is often performed based on Kalman Filters (KFs) to deal with noisy measurement data and detect Bad Data (BD) due to failures in the measurement system. Nevertheless, in a setting where attackers can gain access to modify sensor data, they can exploit the fact that SE is used to process the data. In this paper, we show how an attacker can modify Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) sensor data in a way that it remains undetected in the state estimation process. We show how anomaly detection methods based on innovation gain fail if an attacker is aware of the state estimation and uses the right strategy to circumvent detection.

OriginalspracheEnglisch
TitelARES 2018 - 13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Herausgeber (Verlag)ACM
Seiten16:1-16:10
Seitenumfang10
ISBN (elektronisch)9781450364485
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 27 Aug. 2018
Extern publiziertJa

Publikationsreihe

NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series

Fingerprint

Untersuchen Sie die Forschungsthemen von „Stealthy attacks on smart grid PMU state estimation“. Zusammen bilden sie einen einzigartigen Fingerprint.

Dieses zitieren