Stealthy attacks on smart grid PMU state estimation

Sarita Paudel, Paul Smith, Tanja Zseby

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandKonferenzbeitragBegutachtung


Smart grids require communication networks for supervision functions and control operations. With this they become attractive targets for attackers. In newer power grids, State Estimation (SE) is often performed based on Kalman Filters (KFs) to deal with noisy measurement data and detect Bad Data (BD) due to failures in the measurement system. Nevertheless, in a setting where attackers can gain access to modify sensor data, they can exploit the fact that SE is used to process the data. In this paper, we show how an attacker can modify Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) sensor data in a way that it remains undetected in the state estimation process. We show how anomaly detection methods based on innovation gain fail if an attacker is aware of the state estimation and uses the right strategy to circumvent detection.

TitelARES 2018 - 13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Herausgeber (Verlag)ACM
ISBN (elektronisch)9781450364485
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 27 Aug. 2018
Extern publiziertJa


NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series


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